A. Manipulation and Costs of Cheating
In this Appendix, we estimate the relationship between the number of surveys conducted and amount of cheating observed with the costs of cheating. The available data that proxies for the cost of cheating do not vary over time. We use number of community organizations and number of the main newspaper in circulation as measures for the costs of manipulation in a given municipality.
Data. -Previous studies have found that institutions are stronger when there is more community oversight or when citizens are better informed.
1 . One measure for institution quality that we use is the number of community organizations in each municipality in 1998. Rosas and Mendoza (2005) describe community organizations as neighborhood level government accountability and conflict resolution entities sometimes involved in local infrastructure projects. An article by Sandra V. Chávez (2006) 2 explains the key role that community organizations play in improving and monitoring the transparency of public resources. These data come from a non-profit civil foundation, the Social Foundation (Fundación Social).
We also use newspaper circulation data, with the idea that it is harder to cheat in municipalities where the citizens are better informed about public affairs.
3 Newspaper circulation corresponds to certified daily average circulation data by municipality for 2004 from Colombia's main national newspaper, El Tiempo.
Other cross section data that we use include: an alternative measure for poverty in a municipality which is the proportion of people with Unsatisfied Basic Needs (NBI in Spanish) constructed using information from the 1993 and 2005 Population Census; the distance from the municipality to the largest city in the state measured in kilometers; and the size of the municipality in square kilometers. These data come from DANE. Summary statistics are provided in the main text in Table 2. 1 Ariel Fiszbein (1995) ; Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess (2002) ; Andrés Rosas and Juan Mendoza (2005) 2 "Transparencia, Antídoto contra la Corrupción", July 2006, available at: http://www.comunikandonos.com/sitio/reputacion-coporativa/78-transparencia-antoto-contra-lacorrupci.html 3 See Sam Schulhofer-Wohl and Miguel Garrido (2009) for a recent article on how a decrease in newspaper circulation affected the number of candidates that ran for office, the probability of the incumbent winning an election and voter turnout in Cincinnati.
Empirical Findings. -The equation we use to determine whether the proportion of surveys is smaller when the costs of cheating are higher has the following form:
proportion surveys jt = α + β 1 costs j + β 2 lnpop jt + β 3 demography jt (A1)
Where the dependent variable proportion surveys, is the fraction of annual surveys conducted in the 6 months prior to the election. costs is either the number of community organizations or the daily average newspaper circulation from May to October in each municipality.
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The equation we use to determine whether the size of the discontinuity is smaller when the costs of cheating are higher has the following form:
Where the dependent variable discontinuity, again proxies for the amount of cheating in a municipality. costs are defined as in equation A1.
A concern about running a cross section regression is that the mode of the score distribution is centered at a different point for each municipality depending on its wealth level. In the variable demography we control for differences in poverty rates across municipalities by including a measure of the proportion of people with unsatisfied basic needs calculated from the 1993 and 2005 population census. We also included in all regressions a measure of the size of the population lnpop, and the proportion of urban population in each municipality. To control for the possibility that more remote areas could have more cheating because of weaker presence of the state, we included the distance to the largest city in the departamento (state). Also in the geography variable we included the surface area of the municipality. We expect to see that municipalities with better monitoring institutions have less cheating. For these regressions we used the same years that we used in the main results: 1997, 2000 and 2003.
We report standardized results. We find that the coefficients have the expected signs, consistent with the idea that better monitoring is associated with a lower fraction of surveys in the 6 months before the election and less cheating in municipalities around election times. Columns (1)- (4) of Table A1 indicate that a standard deviation increase in the number of community organizations or newspaper circulation (s.d. = 325 and 3154 respectively) are associated with a lower fraction of surveys conducted before the elections of 0.03 of a standard deviation. Columns (1)- (4) of Table A2 use the fraction of surveys three points below and above the threshold, while columns (5)- (8) use the fraction of surveys 5 points below and above the threshold. The results indicate that a standard deviation increase in the number of community organizations (newspaper circulation) are associated with a lower percent of interviews three points below the threshold relative to three points above the threshold of 0.026 (0.035) of a standard deviation. The corresponding numbers for five points below the threshold are 0.05 and 0.06 for community organization and newspaper circulation respectively. Also, consistent with the model prediction we see that there is an inverse relation between the discontinuity at the threshold and the proportion of poor in a municipality in Table A2 . Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include an intercept term and report standardized results. The dependent variable is the fraction of annual surveys conducted in the 6 months prior to the election during election years.
Demography controls include proportion urban population and proportion poor population using a measure for unsatisfied basic needs from the 1993 and 2005 Population Census. Geography controls include distance to the largest city (capital) in the departamento (state) and municipality surface area. Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include an intercept term and report standardized results. The dependent variable is the difference in the fraction of interviews 3 and 5 points before the threshold relative to the same points after the threshold divided by the number of points, using data for the 6 months prior to the election during election years. The closer to 0 the smaller the discontinuity at the threshold. Demography controls include proportion urban population and proportion poor population using a measure for unsatisfied basic needs from the 1993 and 2005 Population Census. Geography controls include distance to the largest city (capital) in the departamento (state) and municipality surface area.
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B. Expansion on Alternative Explanations for Patterns in the Score Distribution
Score Algorithm. -The Figure The maximum number of combinations is around 600 million for a score of 50. The minimum is 1 for a score of 100. Figure B1 shows that the simulated distribution does not exhibit a discontinuity at the eligibility threshold or anywhere else. 5 Here we assumed that all combinations are equally likely. In reality however, we expect the covariance between certain answers to be different from zero and not to see some combinations in the population. The score distribution depicted in Figure 3 in the main text uses survey data from representative samples of the Colombian population, which we restrict to strata levels below 4 to make it comparable to the population in the Census of the Poor, this distribution does not exhibit discontinuities at the threshold.
Selection. -An alternative way to test for selection within a municipality and over time, is to use the geographical information from the 1993 Population Census (prior to the implementation of the Census of the Poor) and see how the characteristics of people in neighborhood blocks interviewed earlier compare to those interviewed later. If the characteristics of people in neighborhood blocks interviewed later are worse than those interviewed earlier then we should expect a left-ward shift in the distribution and be concerned about the possibility of selection.
We do this for one municipality, which we call municipality X, with different patterns in the poverty score distribution before and after 1998. Municipality X exhibits a sharp discontinuity at the eligibility threshold in the post-1998 period, see Figure B2 . Using the Census of the Poor we identified neighborhood blocks where interviews were conducted before 1998 and blocks where interviews were conducted after 1998. We took this information to the 1993 Population Census to see if the average characteristics of people interviewed after 1998 are worse than those interviewed before 1998. Accounting for the number of households interviewed in each block we graphed the mean characteristics of the people interviewed in the pre and post-1998 period. Overall, the neighborhoods interviewed later do not look worse than the neighborhoods interviewed earlier as seen in Figure B3 . Even if this was the case, we would expect a leftward shift in the distribution and not necessarily a sharp discontinuity exactly at the threshold. 
